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DEMOCRATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE THROUGH
CONTESTATION AND RESISTANCE
Jocelyn Simonson
ABSTRACT—Collective forms of participation in criminal justice from
members of marginalized groups—for example, when people gather
together to engage in participatory defense, organized copwatching,
community bail funds, or prison labor strikes—have a profound effect on
everyday criminal justice. In this Essay I argue that these bottom-up forms
of participation are not only powerful and important, but also crucial for
democratic criminal justice. Collective mechanisms of resistance and
contestation build agency, remedy power imbalances, bring aggregate
structural harms into view, and shift deeply entrenched legal and
constitutional meanings. Many of these forms of contestation display a
faith in local democracy as a tool of responsive criminal justice, while
simultaneously maintaining a healthy skepticism of the law and existing
legal institutions that maintain the status quo. These forms of resistance and
contestation are not antagonistic, but agonistic; not revolutionary, but
devolutionary. Without facilitating critical resistance from below, wellmeaning criminal justice reforms are in danger of reproducing the antidemocratic pathologies that plague our existing system. Indeed, it is from
the voices of those who have been most harmed by the punitive nature of
our criminal justice system that we can hear the most profound
reimaginings of how the system might be truly responsive to local demands
for justice and equality. This Essay concludes by sketching out the dual
roles of the state in a criminal justice system that values contestation: to
facilitate methods of participation that originate with and are led by nonelite actors from marginalized populations; and to create criminal justice
institutions that transfer agency and control to people ordinarily left out of
criminal justice decisionmaking.
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INTRODUCTION
America’s criminal justice system is anti-democratic in at least three
distinct senses. First, the system is run and maintained by privileged
insiders. There is little transparency, participation, or day-to-day
accountability in today’s police precincts and criminal courthouses, and the
result is that communal input into everyday justice has all but disappeared.1
Second, even for the very few ways in which ordinary citizens do
participate in criminal justice, for example through voting or juries, the
unequal distribution of political power means that the resulting criminal
laws and enforcement are rarely responsive to the interests of the poor
populations of color most likely to come into contact with the system as
arrestees, defendants, or victims. The mass incarceration and supervision of
poor communities of color only exacerbate these political inequalities.2
And third, when marginalized populations do participate in democratic
processes meant to facilitate their input, their participation is often muted
by those very processes, reinscribing rather than dismantling existing
power imbalances.3 These multiple layers of democratic exclusion reinforce
each other, reproducing and legitimizing an unequal, racialized system of
justice.
Although the notion of democratic criminal justice is deeply
contested,4 it has tended in recent decades to center around ideas that

1

See generally LAURA I APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2015); STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29–60 (2012).
2
See generally TRACI BURCH, TRADING DEMOCRACY FOR JUSTICE: CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AND
THE DECLINE OF NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 75–104 (2013); AMY E. LERMAN &
VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN
CRIME CONTROL 199–231 (2014); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 244–81 (2011); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1291–98 (2004).
3
See, e.g., DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 66–105 (2008) (describing
these dangers in the context of participation and policing).
4
Cf. Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2017)
(synthesizing conflicting notions of democratic criminal justice).
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emphasize and idealize participation through deliberation.5 When it comes
to remedying the distrust, disengagement, and disenfranchisement of
marginalized groups, the instinct of elites is often to include these
marginalized groups in democratic fora in which their voices can be heard.
From stakeholder meetings,6 to listening sessions,7 to online notice-andcomment procedures,8 these state-driven processes seek the input of
individuals who have historically been shut out of the creation and
execution of criminal justice policies. These well-meaning mechanisms of
participation tackle the first two layers of democratic exclusion: they
increase public input into criminal justice overall and they deliberately seek
out the voices of the marginalized in doing so. However, they are not
always sufficiently attentive to the third layer of democratic exclusion—
internal exclusion—and to the mechanisms through which marginalized
populations often remain politically powerless despite the creation of
democratic institutions meant to facilitate their participation.9
If we truly want to eliminate the racial domination and systemic
oppression of vulnerable populations endemic to our contemporary
criminal justice system, we must expand our go-to conceptions of what we
mean when we call for the participation of the marginalized and oppressed
in our precincts, courthouses, and statehouses. Relying on deliberation and
consensus ignores the ways in which our current criminal justice system
relegates African-Americans and other marginalized populations to nondemocratic subjects—not just through literal disenfranchisement of
individuals with criminal records, but also through doctrine, policy, and
rhetoric.10 Moreover, a focus on seeking consensus may lead us to privilege
5

See SKLANSKY, supra note 3, at 59–105 (describing this trend in the context of policing).
See, e.g., CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, GRAND RAPIDS POLICE DEPARTMENT SEEKS PUBLIC INPUT ON
ITS MISSION (2016), http://grcity.us/Pages/Police-Department-seeks-public-input-on-its-mission.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZQ46-SNNB] (describing a series of stakeholder meetings).
7
See, e.g., CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., LISTENING SESSION (2016),
http://sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/USJusticeInitiative/SanFrancisco_Community%20Listen
ing%20Session%20Flyer_%20Mission(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/BN7N-SXW9] (advertising an open
forum intended to improve the San Francisco Police Department).
8
See,
e.g.,
NYPD
Body-Worn
Camera
Questionnaire,
POLICING
PROJECT,
https://policingproject.org/nypd-body-worn-camera-feedback/
[https://perma.cc/T4E2-ZREQ]
(describing an online survey designed to solicit comments from New York City residents on the
NYPD’s body camera program).
9
See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 52–57 (2000) (describing the
process of “internal exclusion”).
10
See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 160–80 (2001) (arguing that broken windows policing objectifies poor people and
people of color); LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 2 (describing the myriad ways in which crime control
policies disempower marginalized populations and undermine democracy); JONATHAN SIMON,
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007) (arguing that an overemphasis on crime and fear of crime has
6
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discourse that repeats rather than re-envisions our reigning ideas of what
criminal justice should look like. A complete blueprint for democratic
criminal justice requires embracing adversarial, contestatory forms of
participation and resistance that go beyond the decorum of calm
deliberation to build power and push for transformation.
In past work I have emphasized the importance of studying and
respecting grassroots forms of participation in and disruption of everyday
criminal justice—for example, when organized groups participate in
copwatching, courtwatching, or community bail funds.11 In this Essay I
argue that bottom-up forms of participation are not only powerful and
important, but also crucial for democratic criminal justice.12 Collective
mechanisms of resistance and contestation build agency, remedy power
imbalances, bring aggregate structural harms into view, and shift deeply
entrenched legal and constitutional meanings. Many of these forms of
contestation display a faith in local democracy as a tool of responsive
criminal justice, while simultaneously maintaining a healthy skepticism of
the law and existing legal institutions that maintain the status quo. These
forms of resistance and contestation are not antagonistic, but agonistic;13
not revolutionary, but devolutionary.14 Without facilitating critical
resistance from below, well-meaning reforms are in danger of reproducing
the anti-democratic pathologies that plague our existing criminal justice
system. In the words of one of the founders of the participatory defense
movement, this requires envisioning a world in which “the millions who
face prison or jail and their communities, those waiting in line at court
everyday . . . shift from being fodder of the criminal justice system, to
distorted American democracy); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform & the Dismantling of Legal
Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2067 (2017) (demonstrating that “current [criminal justice] regimes
can operate to effectively banish whole communities from the body politic”); Devon W. Carbado,
(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 966 (2002) (describing how Fourth
Amendment doctrine reproduces racial inequalities).
11
See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017) [hereinafter Simonson,
Bail Nullification]; Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (2016) [hereinafter
Simonson, Copwatching]; Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014) [hereinafter Simonson, Audience].
12
In making this argument, I am particularly indebted to David Sklansky’s work mapping the
intersections of democratic theory and American criminal justice, and to Janet Moore’s work
connecting grassroots mobilization to democracy in criminal justice. See SKLANSKY, supra note 3;
Janet Moore, Decarceral Constitutionalism (Dec. 2016) (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
13
See generally CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 5–9 (2013)
(describing agonistic politics as involving confrontation, debate, and dissent, but not antagonism or
withdrawal from politics).
14
Cf. Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of
Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2017) (“Pushing more criminal justice power . . . down to
directly affected communities and neighborhoods could enhance representativeness and sharpen lines of
authority.”).
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those fated to bring the era of mass incarceration to its rightful end.”15
Indeed, it is from the voices of those who have been most harmed by the
punitive nature of our criminal justice system that we can hear the most
profound reimaginings of how the system might be truly responsive to local
demands for justice and equality.16
If I can insert one idea into this Symposium issue on democratizing
criminal justice, it is that we should not be content with inviting the voices
and viewpoints of the marginalized into our existing institutions; we also
need to support outside mechanisms of agonistic participation and create
new spaces of contestation. I begin this Essay in Part I by drawing on
democratic theory, constitutional values, and visions of contemporary
social movements to present a preliminary case for why we should study
and promote contestation, agonism, and oppositional politics in criminal
justice. In Part II, I recount examples of powerful bottom-up tactics of
resistance and participation, including the tactics of organized
copwatching, participatory defense, community bail funds, and prison
strikes. Then, in Part III, I sketch out the dual roles of the state in a criminal
justice system that values contestation: to facilitate methods of participation
that originate with and are led by non-elite actors from marginalized
populations; and to create criminal justice institutions that transfer agency
and control to people ordinarily left out of criminal justice decisionmaking.
I.

COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE AS DEMOCRATIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The importance of collective resistance is central to many prominent
conceptions of democracy. To begin with, our Constitution enshrines the
value of protecting and even promoting resistance to state power. The First
Amendment’s protections for dissent, assembly, and publicity all
underscore the idea that “elections, political parties, and voting, while
critical to democracy, are not the whole deal.”17 The Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of public input into everyday adjudication, through both juries
15

Raj Jayadev, “Participatory Defense” – Transforming the Courts Through Family and
Community Organizing, ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUSTICE PROJECT (Oct. 17, 2014),
https://acjusticeproject.org/2014/10/17/participatory-defense-transforming-the-courts-through-familyand-community-organizing-by-raj-jayadev/ [https://perma.cc/WEE2-BNLD].
16
See Amna A. Akbar, Borderlands: Policing Reimagined 33–47 (Feb. 20, 2017) (unpublished
draft) (on file with author) (describing the ways in which the Movement for Black Lives profoundly
recasts the terms of the debate around American policing); cf. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that legal
scholarship can benefit from listening to marginalized voices).
17
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. 1097 (2016) (arguing that the First Amendment endorses an active form of citizenship
involving open communication and dissent).
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and the courtroom audience, passes on to the public the ability not only to
deliberate about state power, but also to challenge it.18 And individual
criminal procedure rights can be understood as a means of protecting the
ability of citizens to resist the power of state violence.19 The formal
structure of American democracy thus leaves ample room to think about
public participation in criminal justice governance as including grassroots
efforts to contest state actions outside of formal state-driven channels.
The importance of collective resistance also echoes throughout a
number of areas of democratic theory, including theories of
neorepublicanism, radical democracy, critical theory, and theories of law
and social movements. The neorepublicanism of Philip Pettit, for example,
places an emphasis on the importance of contestatory publics that serve as
a counter to domination.20 Scholars such as Sabeel Rahman have expanded
this idea, insisting that we think about contestation beyond individual
moments of disagreement to include larger methods of collective political
action that resist structural domination and inequality.21 The importance of
collective contestation is also embedded in the concept of agonism—a
politics that respects conflict and adversarialism, but seeks to channel it
through democratic channels —found within the radical democratic theory
of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau.22 Although not theories of
democracy per se, a number of strands of critical theory have also
developed useful accounts of the emancipatory potential of collective acts
of resistance when those acts create agency through bottom-up critique of
the status quo.23 And theories of law and social movements, as well as
18

See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (describing the ability of the jury to challenge state power through
nullification); Simonson, Audience, supra note 11, at 2195–220 (describing the power of the audience
through courtwatching).
19
See generally Jenny E. Carroll, The Resistance Defense, 64 ALA. L. REV. 589 (2013); Eric J.
Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
295; Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555 (2015).
20
See PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF
DEMOCRACY 5–25 (2012); see also YOUNG, supra note 9, at 258–59 (combining Pettit’s
neorepublicanism with feminist ideas of relational autonomy to put forth a vision of inclusive
democratic institutions).
21
K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination: Contesting Economic Power in Progressive
and Neorepublican Political Theory, 16 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 41 (2016); see also PIERRE
ROSANVALLON, COUNTER-DEMOCRACY: POLITICS IN AN AGE OF DISTRUST (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2008).
22
See MOUFFE, supra note 13, at 1–19; see also Simonson, Copwatching, supra note 11, at 435–38
(arguing that organized copwatching is a form of agonistic political engagement).
23
See, e.g., DAVID COUZENS HOY, CRITICAL RESISTANCE: FROM POSTSTRUCTURALISM TO POSTCRITIQUE (2004) (locating concepts of critical resistance across different strands of critical theory);
Bernard E. Harcourt, A Dialectic of Theory and Practice, 12 CARCERAL NOTEBOOKS 19 (2016),
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social movement theory, often center collective resistance in analyses of
the ways in which courts and other state institutions can serve as sites of
contestation, framing, and, ultimately, change.24
These constitutional and democratic values coalesce around a general
idea that it is possible to embrace grassroots politics without a singular
focus on deliberation and consensus as touchstones of inclusive democracy.
Instead, we must sometimes yield to unruly, outside decisionmaking in
order to temper injustice and ground responsive politics. In the context of
criminal justice, this would mean opening up new channels of contestation
accessible to the groups and communities that are most affected by the
state’s domination but have the least input into the state’s policies and
practices.25 And yet, among those scholars and state actors most focused on
increasing public participation in criminal justice today, there is a striking
emphasis on inclusion, participation, and consensus. Moreover, recent
examples of powerful contestatory practices by marginalized groups—for
example, organized copwatching and prison labor strikes—have been met
with either resistance or silence from state actors, including state actors in
local administrations seeking to push through liberal reforms and reduce
the imprint of mass incarceration.26
Promoting collective contestation in criminal justice therefore
involves critiquing, albeit sometimes implicitly, the deliberative forms of
democracy that dominate progressive efforts to remedy inequality in the
criminal justice system.27 Indeed, in practice there is a dialogical
relationship between the promotion of contestatory forms of participation
and critiques of consensus-seeking forms of participation. To help illustrate
this phenomenon, consider the conflicting narratives surrounding the
http://www.thecarceral.org/cn12/3__Dialectic_of_Theory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/454P-VDVF]
(describing the relationship between Foucault’s theories and practices of resistance).
24
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 927, 946–48 (2006); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2757–68 (2014); Michael W.
McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in HOW DOES LAW MATTER? 76, 90–100
(Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
25
See Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
543, 566 (“A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law . . . prioritiz[es] the empowerment of lowincome and minority individuals and communities to participate more fully in the formation and
implementation of criminal justice policies.”).
26
See, e.g., Simonson, Copwatching, supra note 11, at 427–29 (describing resistance of police
departments to filming the police); Memorandum from Hunger Strike Representatives to Scott Kernan,
CDCR Undersecretary (Oct. 12, 2011), https://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/
education/pelican-bay-prisoners-go-on-hunger-strike-to-protest-grave-conditions/2nd-round/memofrom-hunger-strike-representatives-to-cdcr-undersecretary-scott-kernan/
[https://perma.cc/8ABZRY7W] (describing retaliation against prisoners engaged in hunger strikes at Pelican Bay prison).
27
See SKLANSKY, supra note 3, at 52–105.
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implementation of a community policing program, the Chicago Alternative
Policing Strategy (“CAPS”). Community policing is an idealized form of
participatory, consensus-based democracy in action.28 In October 2015,
President Obama praised Mayor Rahm Emmanuel’s community policing
strategy for “forming new partnerships with ministers, putting more
officers on bikes and on foot so they can talk with residents.”29 That very
same month, local activists issued their own “Counter-CAPS Report.” The
report’s authors collected their own data surrounding the operations of
CAPS and concluded that Emmanuel’s “‘community policing’ is the
superficial involvement of select community members in providing police
with legitimacy.”30 This local organization’s work—gathering their own
data about the effects of Chicago’s community policing program and
publicizing their findings—is itself an example of a contestatory form of
participation outside of formal state-driven mechanisms. And the report
itself articulates two central critiques of the push for consensus through
“community justice”: that community justice excludes, both internally and
externally, the most marginalized from its participatory mechanisms; and
that, in doing so, it fails to appreciate more transformative remedies to our
criminal justice ills.31 To promote contestation is to facilitate productive
critiques of our go-to democratizing strategies, and vice versa.
Focusing on the decorum of deliberation can lead us to discount
messier, oppositional forms of contestation, equating disruption with
criminality and reinforcing the very inequalities that reforms aim to
dismantle. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward identified this
phenomenon in their classic study of the relationship between social
movements and elites, arguing that demands by poor people for political
recognition and power are often undermined when elites focus on methods
of participation that mute any oppositional politics. This turn to conflictfree institutions serves “to divert attention from many forms of political
unrest and to consign them by definition to the more shadowy realms of
social problems and deviant behavior.”32 It is in those shadowy realms,
28

See id. at 82–105.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the 122nd Annual IACP Conference (Oct.
27, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/27/remarks-president-122ndannual-iacp-conference [https://perma.cc/YJ8R-LSB5].
30
WE CHARGE GENOCIDE, COUNTER-CAPS REPORT: THE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ARM OF
THE POLICE STATE 3 (2015), http://wechargegenocide.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CAPSreportfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5A3-8QTF]. Elaborating on the “superficial” nature of CAPS, the report
states that “[a] self-selecting group of empowered community members, who are frequently gentrifiers,
work with police to deflect criticism and build local support for policing.” Id.
31
Id. at 3–15.
32
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY
SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 5 (1977).
29
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though, that we find some of the most innovative forms of collective
resistance to the status quo of criminal justice in America.
II.

COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE FROM BELOW

To observe agonistic contestation in action, one need only walk the
streets of neighborhoods with a large police presence or enter a crowded
local criminal courtroom. Every day, marginalized groups living in the
shadow of the carceral state engage in acts of resistance, large and small,
that go beyond mass protest or social media campaigns. The value of these
moments of communal intervention is not participation for its own sake,
but rather the potential to build power and shift legal meanings. This Part
briefly describes the power of some tactics of resistance that marginalized
groups are using to destabilize the everyday workings of the criminal
justice system.33 These tactics illustrate the ways in which contestation
outside of formal state-driven mechanisms can play a part in shifting power
and agency to marginalized groups, destabilizing entrenched legal and
constitutional meanings, and demonstrating to the larger public the
communal and structural harms that the criminal justice system creates and
perpetuates.34
One example is collective resistance within the courtroom. State
criminal courtrooms and courthouse hallways are often crowded with
defendants, victims, and their families—the people most affected by local
criminal justice. However, despite the presence of marginalized
populations in the courthouse, these courthouse visitors are denied the
ability to participate meaningfully in everyday justice. Judges conduct
short, routine court appearances at inaudible volumes and in inscrutable
language, masking the important decisions and policies that have led to a
particular prosecution, plea, or sentence.35 The exclusionary dynamics of
criminal courtrooms, however, shift and bend when organized groups come
together to observe and intervene in courtroom proceedings. Courtwatching
groups affiliated with larger social movements, for example, gather
volunteers to document everyday proceedings in local courts—bond
33

Although I describe practices taking place today, collective resistance in American criminal
justice is of course not just a contemporary phenomenon.
34
For accounts of ways in which aggregate or communal harms can be minimized in the process of
criminal justice policy-making, see, for example, Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas,
Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924584 [https://perma.cc/5WHB-GQ4N]; Rachel A. Harmon, Federal
Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 912–28, 936 (2015).
35
See BIBAS, supra note 1 (describing the mechanical nature of state courtroom proceedings, in
contrast to the “morality plays” of colonial times); Simonson, Audience, supra note 11, at 2190–95
(describing the exclusion of the audience in criminal courtrooms).
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hearings, arraignments, plea bargains—and report to the public the results
of their observations. These community groups become self-appointed
watchdogs who can present the results of their observations in their own
words, on their own terms, and independent of official accounts of policies
and trends.36 Similarly, community groups involved in “participatory
defense” join with families, friends, neighbors, and allies of defendants to
learn about the facts and procedures of individual cases, perform
investigations, and ultimately aim to “change the landscape of power . . . in
the criminal justice system.”37
The tactics of courtwatching and participatory defense can have an
effect on the adjudication of everyday, low-level cases.38 Courtwatching
groups help define the proceedings through their presence, reminding
courtroom players that each individual case is connected to larger
aggregate harms to families and neighborhoods.39 And, by doing so, these
tactics shift power and build agency among individuals previously
delegated to subjects, not objects, of the state. This agency, in turn, can
lead to robust engagement with legal and constitutional meanings—for
example, when courtwatching organizations uncover the relationship
between policing policies and misdemeanor adjudications40 or participatory
defense groups push the boundaries of the right to counsel.41
A similar power shift occurs when poor people and people of color
engage in organized copwatching of police officers on the streets of their
neighborhoods.42 Like other methods of documenting police conduct—for
example, police-worn body cameras—copwatching deters police
misconduct in the moment and promotes police accountability after the
fact. But the tactic of organized copwatching does more than deter and
36

For examples of this at work, see 8 Week Court Watching Project!!, COMMUNITY RENEWAL
SOC’Y, http://www.communityrenewalsociety.org/calendar/8-week-court-watching-project [https://
S T.
LOUIS,
perma.cc/9MEF-LKMQ];
Municipal
Court
Watching,
DECARCERATE
http://www.decarceratestl.com/municipal_court_watching [https://perma.cc/V5X5-SHQ5].
37
See Robin Yeamans, Fighting for Justice by Court Watching, PEOPLE’S TRIB., May 29, 2012, at
11; see also Janet Moore et al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle for
Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281 (2015).
38
I describe the criminal court audience as a site of power shifts in more detail in prior work. See
Simonson, Audience, supra note 11.
39
Cf. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE 300–02 (2011) (describing
how audience members “deny[] the government and disputants unchecked authority to determine the
social meanings of conflicts and their resolutions”).
40
See, e.g., The Court Monitoring Project, POLICE REFORM ORGANIZING PROJECT,
http://www.policereformorganizingproject.org/court-monitoring-project/
[https://perma.cc/6ED2KLDQ]; see also Simonson, Audience, supra note 11, at 2183–84 (documenting the impact an audience
can have on court proceedings).
41
See Moore, supra note 12.
42
I describe this phenomenon in more detail in Simonson, Copwatching, supra note 11, at 408–27.
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document; it also shifts power, creates agency, and sparks legal
imaginations. Copwatchers engage with legal and constitutional principles
at the same time that they enforce them, communicating to police officers
in the moment that their conduct will influence future dialogue about the
limits of police violence. In particular, copwatching challenges the
traditional monopoly that courts and police officers have to determine what
is “reasonable” or “suspicious” under the Fourth Amendment. And, as the
results and ideas generated by organized copwatchers percolate into the
public sphere and into the courtroom, they can in turn affect larger legal
and constitutional understandings. As with courtwatching, copwatchers’
control over their own actions, data, and participation turns the tables on
the traditional control that state officials possess to dictate the terms of
public participation, and, by extension, to define the public to whom the
system is accountable.43
Another tactic of communal resistance, community bail funds,
straddles the space between courtrooms and local jails. Community bail
funds are grassroots collectives or nonprofits that post bail or bond for
defendants who would otherwise be incarcerated pretrial awaiting the
disposition of their cases. By posting bail for multiple defendants over a
period of time, community bail funds engage in ongoing resistance to the
status quo of money bail. The power of community bail funds is not just
that they allow outsiders to intervene in individual criminal cases; if that
were the only effect of bail funds, then they might actually legitimate an
unjust system by greasing its wheels. Rather, community bail funds
connect the literal act of posting bail to the greater communal harms of a
criminal justice system that funnels members of particular neighborhoods
in and out of jails because of their poverty. When a “community” group
repeatedly posts bail for strangers, the group contests deeply entrenched
understandings of the concepts of “community,” “risk,” and “criminality,”
upon which the legitimacy of the practice of pretrial detention depends.
Community bail funds demonstrate that the entire logic of bail and pretrial
detention—that money bail is a necessary incentive for someone to come
back to court; that the “community” is better off when someone is detained
pretrial—rests on shaky ground. The result is profoundly destabilizing, not
just for the institution of money bail, but also for the larger dynamics of
power and control in the criminal courthouse.44
Recent years have also seen potent forms of collective resistance from
within prison walls, particularly through hunger strikes and labor strikes.
43

Id.
I describe the power of community bail funds as a form of collective resistance in more detail in
Simonson, Bail Nullification, supra note 11.
44
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Incarcerated individuals’ ability to publicize their on-the-ground realities to
the larger world is an especially powerful tactic of resistance, undermining
the complete control that the institution of the prison has over the people
trapped within it.45 For example, in 2011 and 2013, incarcerated individuals
in California engaged in a series of hunger strikes aimed at drawing
attention to the degrading conditions in which they were held. Their
suffering and demands—ranging from adequate food to an end to longterm solitary confinement—were brought to the attention of the public
through on-the-ground organizing of the Prisoner Hunger Strike Solidarity
network, both inside and outside of the Pelican Bay prison. Lisa Guenther
describes this collective action as the “emergence of a community of
resistance through the performative declaration and affirmation of rights
that one does not (yet) have.”46 The incarcerated collective used
contestation to demand dignity, calling attention to the ways in which they
are treated as less than human and in the process reclaiming their own
agency.47 These demands for dignity then influenced the prison’s reform of
its practices of solitary confinement48 and interacted with the large-scale
litigation over the Eighth Amendment implications of prison conditions and
overcrowding in California.49 This bottom-up contestation was echoed in
2016, when activists engaged in a national labor strike in prisons across the
United States on the anniversary of the Attica uprising, drawing attention
not just to the legalized slave labor, but also to larger dynamics of race,
class, and mass incarceration.50
Each of the collective practices that I have described above shifts
power. Each of them destabilizes entrenched legal understandings upon
45

See Perry Zurn & Andrew Dilts, Active Intolerance: An Introduction, in ACTIVE INTOLERANCE:
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE PRISONS INFORMATION GROUP, AND THE FUTURE OF ABOLITION 1, 8–9 (Perry
Zurn & Andrew Dilts eds., 2016).
46
See Lisa Guenther, Beyond Guilt and Innocence: The Creaturely Politics of Prisoner Resistance
Movements, in ACTIVE INTOLERANCE, supra note 45, at 225, 227.
47
Id.
48
See Sal Rodriguez, California Prison Hunger Strikes Sparked Solitary Reforms, Internal
Documents Show, SOLITARY WATCH (Sept. 2, 2015), http://solitarywatch.com/2015/09/02/californiaprison-hunger-strikes-spurred-solitary-reforms-internal-documents-show/
[https://perma.cc/Q3ZP5JTU] (describing evidence that solitary confinement reforms were initiated as a direct result of the
2011 and 2013 hunger strikes, despite prison officials’ statements to the contrary).
49
Cf. JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 135–37 (2014) (describing the move
towards recognizing dignity in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the wake of the California prison
litigation).
50
See Dan Berger, Rattling the Cages, JACOBIN (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/
2016/11/prison-strike-slavery-attica-racism-incarceration/ [https://perma.cc/HRU3-VR9A]; E. Tammy
Kim, A National Strike Against “Prison Slavery,” NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-national-strike-against-prison-slavery [https://perma.cc/
2W5A-8CAV].
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which the legitimacy of the criminal justice system relies. Each of them
uses the voices of those affected by policies in the aggregate to demonstrate
to the larger public the harms of those policies. And each of them puts forth
new visions of what our criminal justice system can and should look like.
In order to make room for the possibility of these new visions, we need to
begin by supporting mechanisms of participation in which marginalized
outsiders set the terms of engagement, displaying a healthy skepticism of
the law and legal institutions that maintain the status quo.51
III.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN DEMOCRATIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The methods of communal intervention I have been describing are
born outside of the state and controlled by non-state actors. However, each
branch and level of government has an important role to play in supporting
and facilitating productive agonistic practices. As a preliminary matter, the
state should eliminate formal barriers to democratic participation from
marginalized populations. Any model of democratic criminal justice is
incomplete without a push to restore voting rights to incarcerated
individuals and those with criminal records.52 States interested in bolstering
the political power of those most affected by local criminal justice policies
can also allow non-citizens and youth to serve on juries and vote in local
elections; eliminate death-qualifying juries;53 reinvest in neighborhoods
weakened by mass incarceration;54 and push for inclusionary forms of
citizenship for immigrants who are not United States citizens.55 Although I
have described these reforms as preliminary, the paradox is that without
first possessing sufficient political power to call for reforms,
disenfranchised populations struggle to attain formal political recognition.
The change must therefore begin elsewhere, through processes that

51

Implicit in my argument is a belief that our current system is not a product of bad apples ignoring
constitutional rules or disobeying laws, but of state institutions and constitutional doctrine legally
facilitating oppression and exclusion. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed
to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016).
52
See generally NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC. & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FREE THE
VOTE: UNLOCKING DEMOCRACY IN THE CELLS AND ON THE STREETS (2016), http://www.naacpldf.org/
files/about-us/Free%20the%20Vote%202016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/92Y6-BLGL].
53
See J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death Qualification of Capital Jurors,
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1169 (2014) (arguing it may be appropriate to abolish death-qualifying
juries if minority groups are continually prevented from participating).
54
See LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 2, at 253–55.
55
See Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 869 (2015).
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simultaneously build power and push against dominant conceptions of what
it means to count as a citizen or democratic subject.56
The state should facilitate—rather than silence—the efforts of
disenfranchised groups to participate in criminal justice through
contestatory modes of popular resistance. All too often, police and courts
meet bottom-up participatory tactics with resistance, calling them
disruptive and harmful to the decorum of everyday justice. Police arrest
organized copwatchers for filming; administrators close courtrooms to the
public; judges shut down community bail funds; prison officials retaliate
against people striking in prison; and federal investigators increase
surveillance of social movements that aim to transform the criminal justice
system.57 However, we can imagine how state actors might instead enact
policies that allow for disruptive but nonviolent forms of protest and
intervention. Localities can promote policing policies that respect the right
of the people to assemble, protest and dissent; courts can enforce the First
and Sixth Amendment rights of community members to dissent and
intervene; court administrators can ensure open courtrooms and allow
audience members to participate in proceedings upon request; and prison
officials can permit prisoners to fast, strike, and publicize these mass
actions beyond prison walls.
Finally, we can imagine state-driven processes that themselves allow
for community control of local criminal justice policies and priorities. The
key here is to design methods of governance that facilitate power shifts, not
just deliberation.58 Local juries that include individuals with criminal
records might make decisions about individual cases and larger criminal
justice policies alike.59 A local police review board, drawn from residents

56

See, e.g., Guinier & Torres, supra note 24, at 2761–72 (describing this process in the context of
the work of Fannie Lou Hamer and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party).
57
See Amna A. Akbar, Policing Black Radicalism, JACOBIN (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/08/cointelpro-fbi-black-panther-party-young-lords-hoover/ [https://
perma.cc/98ZV-WFRW] (describing increased surveillance on Black Lives Matter organizers); Jocelyn
Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559
(2016) (describing resistance against copwatchers and individuals who record the police); Simonson,
Bail Nullification, supra note 11, at 126 (describing retaliation against a community bail fund);
Memorandum from Hunger Strike Representatives, supra note 26 (describing retaliation against
incarcerated individuals conducting hunger strikes).
58
A number of recent scholars have highlighted the importance of paying attention to the ways in
which various forms of governance impede or facilitate power. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Confronting
Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2016); Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015
Term — Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2016); Rahman, supra
note 21.
59
Cf. APPLEMAN, supra note 1 (examining ways to incorporate the community in the criminal
justice system through the jury trial right); Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand
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of a particular neighborhood, might be given the power to make both
disciplinary and policy decisions.60 And judges designing and enforcing
consent decrees might give power to community groups and other
marginalized stakeholders to design or veto portions of consent decrees that
affect their neighborhoods.61 Any push to move decisionmaking and
resource allocation in criminal justice down to the local level is a
potentially useful one.62 But we should not rest at local, consensus-building
strategies alone. Given the profound inequalities in political power that
pervade our current system, we should also seek out methods of
governance that hand over levers of power to the powerless.
To pursue any of these avenues, government actors must be open to
the possibility of what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls “nonreformist reform”—
“changes that, at the end of the day, unravel rather than widen the net of
social control through criminalization.”63 There is reason to think that if
those most likely to be arrested and incarcerated were given truly equal
influence over policy, and if policymaking happened more locally, then the
criminal justice system would be less rather than more punitive.64 Not only
that, law that is responsive to the demands of local democracy will end up
depending less on a punitive criminal justice system, and more on other
modes of state and community support.65
CONCLUSION
Agonistic practices need not be foes of deliberation; but to promote
agonism and contestation means recognizing that deliberation and
consensus alone will not lead to transformative change. Dismantling the
American carceral state will require not just top-down reform, but bottomJuries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319 (2012) (arguing that a grand jury could make recommendations
on the normative or extralegal aspects of low-level cases).
60
See, e.g., M Adams & Max Rameau, Black Community Control over Police, 2016 WIS. L. REV.
515, 530–38; Community Control, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/communitycontrol/ [https://perma.cc/5STY-8TUE].
61
See Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement”
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016).
62
But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Book Review, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and
Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1081–83 (2013) (arguing that increasing local power in
criminal justice will aggravate existing problems because political power is not evenly distributed).
63
RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 242 (2007).
64
See generally Vanessa Barker, Prison and the Public Sphere: Toward a Democratic Theory of
Penal Order, in WHY PRISON? 125 (David Scott ed., 2013) (arguing that states that have “engage[d]
ordinary people in a more open and participatory democratic process” have in turn had lower
incarceration rates).
65
Cf. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 89–92 (1978)
(describing how responsive law involves a reduction in the use of criminal sanctions).
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up efforts to build power and transform institutions. The exciting, but
frightening, potential of “convulsive politics from below”66—collective
resistance and reimagining of our criminal justice system—is that if they
are successful, they will undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system that we have. We will then need to support the wisdom of the
demos as it creates new and better ways to support public safety. Following
the recent work of Amna Akbar,67 scholars of law, social change, and
criminal justice have a responsibility to study and support marginalized and
disenfranchised groups as they create, in the words of one activist–thinker,
“a discourse that gives our communities clear alternatives and new visions,
new imaginings of our public safety.”68

66

MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 282 (2015) (calling for “convulsive politics from below that we need to dismantle the carceral
state and ameliorate other gaping inequalities”).
67
See Akbar, supra note 16; Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal
Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 356–60 (2015).
68
Christina Heatherton, #BlackLivesMatter and Global Visions of Abolition: An Interview with
Patrisse Cullors, in POLICING THE PLANET 35 (Jordan T. Camp & Christina Heatherton eds., 2016); see
also Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1238–39
(2015) (bringing the social movement concept of prison abolition into conversation with criminal
justice theory).
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